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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a conflict of laws rule evolves which shapes some jurisdictional contours
out of the custody tangle, retention of this rule appears to be the most
advisable course.
JOHN L. DAVIDSON
Constitutional Law-The Right to Government Employment for Those
Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Loyalty Oaths-Due Process
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City' again
brought before the United States Supreme Court one of the most con-
troversial issues that has confronted our courts in recent years-the
right to continued government employment for those persons who have
not been charged with or convicted of any crime,2 but whose government
service has been terminated3 because of security or loyalty reasons.
Specific examples have involved situations where: (a) the employee's
loyalty was questionable,4 (b) his status as a security risk made his
retention incompatible with the best interests of national security,5 (c)
1350 U. S. 551 (1956).
2"The charge of disloyalty or even of being a security risk has become in the
setting of today so serious that it is almost like a charge of a crime." Garrison,
Some Observations on the Loyalty-Security Program, 23 U. Cnr. L. REV. 1, 2
(1955).
'The cases before the Supreme Court on this point have challenged both state
and federal laws. Although the principles involved are similar, the federal and
state policies that have given rise to the cases have not been the same. The
federal government has established an elaborate and expensive system for in-
vestigating its employees, for conducting loyalty and security hearings and for
reviewing the results of these hearings. The states, if they have acted at all,
have tended to confine their loyalty measures to less expensive and more easily ad-
ministered programs. Generally, with reference to those categories listed in the
text, those cases under a, b, and d have concerned federal employees and those
under c and e have concerned state employees. Both the federal and state cases
should be considered in a discussion pointed primarily at either line of decisions.
'Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331 (1955) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U. S. 918,
(1951).
5 By virtue of Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, the loyalty cases, which
were formerly categorized separately from the security risk cases, are merged with
and are known as security risks.
The criterion for dismissal as established under the first loyalty program was
"on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person in-
volved is disloyal." Executive Order 9835 of March 21, 1947. This criterion was
changed to "reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved." Execu-
tive Order 10241 of April 28, 1951. Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, made
the criterion "whether the ... retention ... is clearly consistent with the interests
of national security." This order provides standards and procedures for the exer-
cise by agency heads of their power under the Summary Suspension Act, 64 STAT.
476, 1950, to summarily dismiss employees in the interests of national security and
establishes the criterion for dismissal as stated above. "There has thus been a
change from loyalty to security. At the present time, a person discharged as a
security risk may well be able to establish his unswerving loyalty. . . . Loyalty
cases as such no longer exist; a disloyal person is now dismissed as a security
risk." Sweeney, People, Government and Security: An Analysis of Three Books
and a Program. 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 79, 81 (1956).
Executive Order 10450 was held invalid to the extent that it authorizes an em-
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his failure to take a loyalty oath disqualified him for government service,0
(d) his past or present membership in or association with organizations
or persons whose activities or ideals are suspect endangered the na-
tional security,7 or (e) his exercise of the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination8 was made sufficient cause for dismissal.9 The Slo-
chower case involved this last point. Even before the Slochower case
the Supreme Court jealously guarded the privilege so as to prevent its
limitation or complete abolition (which has been suggested at times1 °)
by anything less than a Constitutional Amendment; and the Court will
ployee's dismissal "irrespective of the character of his job and its relationship to the
'national security."' The Court held that the Federal Summary Suspension Act
did not authorize the summary dismissal of a federal employee who occupied a
non-sensitive job even though he is charged with disloyalty. Cole v. Young,
351 U. S. 536 (1956). This case recognized and eliminated one of the most
serious objections to the program.
The practical effect of Executive Order 10450 seems to be diametrically op-
posed to the one desired. By placing the loyalty case in the same category as the
security risk the latter is tainted with the more serious stigma of disloyalty and
merely serves as a smoke screen for those who are suspected of actual dis-
loyalty. At the same time there is little actual benefit to the loyalty case since he is
still subject to the same public ostracism. See Garrison, supra note 2, at 2.
' Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); Notes, 50 MIca.
L. REV. 467 (1952), 20 U. CiN. L. REV. 514 (1951).
' "In many instances, it is his associations or character faults which compel
the conclusion that his retention is not clearly consistent with national security."
Sweeney, supra note 5, at 81. Also, see Garrison, supra note 2, at 3.
' U. S. CoNsT. amend. V. See 8 WIGMoRE, EviDENcE, 3rd ed., §§ 2250, 2251
(1940) for a discussion of the history and policy of the privilege.
All states have included similar provisions in their constitution, except the states
of New Jersey and Iowa, and in those states it is held to be a part of the existing
law. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 91 (1908). Also, see Note, Self-
Incrinination-Historical Background of the Doctrine, 44 Ky. L. J. 124 (1955).
"As to the type of proceedings in which the privilege against self-incrimination
may be used, the court has said; 'the object was to insure that a person should not
be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.' ... In a later
case, it said, 'the privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the pro-
ceedings in which the testimony is sought or is used. It applies alike to civil
and criminal proceedings wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal
responsibility him who gives it.'" Trimble, Self-Incrimination and Congressional
Investigations, 44 Ky. L. 1. 333, 335 (1956).
This note does not attempt to deal with the Fifth Amendment in all of its
many ramifications since it is not disputed that the privilege was properly invoked;
but, merely with those aspects surrounding Professor Slochower's summary dis-
missal as a result of his use of the privilege.
' For discussions of this problem see: STUDIES ON PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATIoN-A SYmPosiUm. Historical Background and Implicatiols of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, R. Moreland; Scientific Evidence in the Law,
J. R. Richardson; The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination--Policy Pro and Con,
C. L. Calk; The Investigating Power of Congress-Its Scope and Limitations,
J. R. Richardson; Self-Incrimination and Congressional Investigations, E. G.
Trimble. 44 Ky. L. J. 267 (1956). Also, see PROBLEMS OF THE FnrH AMEND-
MENT IN MODERN TIMEs-A SymPOSiUm. The Right to Silence, J. R. Connery;
The Fifth Amendment Today, E. N. Griswold; The Fifth Amendment in N'on-
Criminal Proceedings, C. C. Williams. 39 MARQ. L. REV. 179 (W 1955-56).
0 This is discussed in two recent articles. Inbau, Should We Abolish the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 2 U. CIN. L. REv. 28 (1955)
Calk, supra note 9, at 303.
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not permit any unfavorable inference to be drawn from the fact that
the privilege has been invoked in a federal proceeding." However out-
side the court, suspicions, questions, and imputations continue to rise and
surround those claiming the privilege.' 2 Frequently, it has resulted in
the loss of that person's job,' 3 which in turn has caused numerous appeals
to the courts as the employees attempt to retain their positions'4 or,
more important in many cases, remove that "badge of infamy"' 5 with
which they have been branded.
The Slochower case is typical of the situations encountered in these
cases. It raised the question of the constitutionality of a statute that
provided for the automatic dismissal of any city employee invoking
the privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid answering a
question relating to his official conduct.16 The appellant was serving
as an associate professor at Brooklyn College, an institution operated
by the City of New York, when he was called to testify before a Con-
gressional investigating committee. 17 He invoked the Fifth Amend-
11 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ; Ullman v. United States, 350
U. S. 422 (1956); See, Note, Constitutional Law--Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination--Iinnunity, 9 Sw. L. J. 474 (1955).
1 Elson, People, Government and Security; An Analysis of Three Books and
A Program, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 83, 85 (1956) ; Garrison, supra note 2, at 1.
1" Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Automatic and Permanent Dis-
missal of Public School Teachers for Invoking the Privilege Against Self-Incrinz-
ination, 54 Micia. L. REV. 126 (1955). For a presentation of the reasons favoring
dismissal see, Note, 34 NEB. L. REv. 88 (1954).
", "Thirteen other individuals brought suit for reinstatement after their dismissal
for pleading the privilege against self-incrimination in the same federal investi-
gation." 350 U. S. 551, 555 and n. 2.
1 "There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person ex-
cluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the com-
munity, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy. Espe-
cially is this so in time of cold war and hot emotions when 'each man begins to eye
his neighbor as a possible enemy.'" Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 190-91
(1953).
1" Section 903 New York City Charter states, "If any ... employee of the city
shall, after lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any
... body authorized to conduct any hearing..., or having appeared shall refuse
to testify, or to answer any question regarding ... affairs of the city ... on the
ground that his answer would tend to incriminate him, . . .his term or tenure of
• .. employment shall be vacant and he shall npt be eligible to ...employment
under the city. ..."
This section was not aimed at communists but was designed to help in the
elimination of graft and corruption. In the past, numerous public employees had
refused to testify as to criminal acts on the ground of self-incrimination and New
York wished to remove these persons from public employment. See, IN THE
MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FINAL REPORT BY SAMUEL SEABURY, December 27,
1932, pp. 9-10.
"'The investigation was being conducted on a national scale by the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and
related to subversive influences in the American Educational system. Recogniz-
ing education to be primarily a state function, the chairman stated that the
inquiry would be limited to "considerations effecting national security, which
are directly within -the purview and authority of the subcommittee." 350 U. S. 551,
553.
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ment while testifying before that committee. Although he had twenty-
seven years' experience; was entitled to tenure under state law; and could
only be dismissed for cause, after notice, hearing and appeal;18 he was
summarily discharged from his position.19 The New York Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal as constitutional but the United States
Supreme Court reversed the finding of that Court and held that the
summary dismissal of the appellant, Slochower, violated due process of
law.20
The appellant, in addition, had attacked the constitutionality of the
act on the ground that it abridged the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States since it in effect imposed a penalty on the
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court did not
decide the privilege and immunity question 2' but held it unconstitutional
as a violation of due process.
22
The principal case does not involve a loyalty oath; nevertheless, an
examination of the loyalty oath cases and their background should be
undertaken since the Court relied largely upon those cases for authority
to support its decision. The examination will provide a better under-
standing of the use of this authority in the present case and will help
explain the basis on which the majority placed its opinion, an opinion
which the minority felt struck deep into the authority of a state "to
protect its local governmental institutions from influences of officials
whose conduct does not meet the declared state standards for employ-
ment."
23
The problems concerning the right to employment in the federal
government are more complex than those concerning state government,
as already indicated24 and the discussion of the former2 5 will be limited
to those aspects of the federal problem as are necessary to the dis-
"
8McKinney's New York Laws; Education Law § 6206(2).
"0 The Court of Appeals of New York has held § 903 to mean that "the asser-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination is equivalent to a resignation."
Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N. Y. 532, 538; 119 N. E. 2d 373 (1954).2  350 U. S. 551, 559.
2 1 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Considering the Court's past approach to
the privilege and immunities question, it is doubtful that there would be any relief
forthcoming under this provision. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ;
Barron v. Mayor, ETC., of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (U. S. 1830);
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (U. S. 1873).22Although two different types of statutes are involved, the Court finds that
their effect is similar. It states, "the heavy hand of the statute fall alike on all
who exercise their constitutional privilege, the full enjoyment of which every
person is entitled to receive. Such action fall squarely within the prohibition of
Wienzan v. Updegraff... there has not been the protection of the individual from
arbitrary action. . . ." 350 U. S. 551, 558.
23 350 U. S. 551, 559-60.
2, See note 3 supra.
22 Shapiro, Government Employment and the Loyalty-Security Progran, 15
LAW GurLD REv. 131 (1955) ; Garrison, supra note 2, at 1.
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cussion of the loyalty oath cases; which primarily, in recent years, have
concerned state statutes. 26
The principle of the loyalty oath is not new and has been used
in this and other countries in earlier times in attempts to determine
or test loyalty.2 7  In the past known as the test oath, the loyalty oath
is its modern counterpart. 28 The United States Supreme Court struck
down attempts by the states 29 and by Congress"0 to establish test oaths
and thereby prevent former Confederates from practicing certain pro-
fessions. These oaths were held to be unconstitutional both as ex post
facto laws and as bills of attainder. The loyalty oaths have been at-
tacked on the same grounds, but in most instances the Court has held
the modern oaths to be valid.
In the current series of loyalty oath cases, four leading decisions had
laid the foundation for the opinion in the Slochower case. They are
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,31 Garner v. Board of Public Works,32
Adler v. Board of Education,38 and Wienwan v. Updegraff. 4 The first
of these, the Gerende case, questioned the constitutionality of a Mary-
land statute8 5 which apparently required every candidate for public
office to swear that he was not engaged in nor advocated any activity
the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force or
violence and that he was not a member of any organization which did
so. However, the Maryland Supreme Court had interpreted the statute
and stated that the oath was intended to apply to those engaged "in one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force
or violence" or who are "knowingly" members of organizations that
do so.8 6 The United States Supreme Court interpreted this Maryland
decision to mean that the candidate need not only take an oath that he
is not "knowingly" a member of an organization engaged in an attempt
to overthrow the government by force or violence and this interpre-
tation was made only on the assurance of the Maryland Attorney Gen-
eral that affidavits stating that the candidate was not ". . . knowingly a
member of an organization engaged in such an attempt"37 would meet
" See note 8 supra.
"Koenigsberg and Stavis, Test Oaths: Henry VIII to the American Bar
Association, 11 LAW. GuiLD RFV. 111 (1951).
28 Fraenkel, Law and Loyalty, 37 IA. L. REv. 153 (1951).
29 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
"oEx Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
1'341 U. S. 56 (1951).
32 341 U. S. 716 (1951) ; See note 6 supra.
3342 U. S. 485 (1952); See Notes, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 111 (1952), 100 U.
PA. L. ZEv. 1244 (1952), 36 MiNe. L. REv. 961 (1952).
"344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; See note 49 infra, for a citation of LAW REviEw notes
commenting on this case.
"
2MD. LAws c. 86, § 15 (1949).
20 Shub v. Simpson, 76 Atl. 2d 332 (Md. 1950).
m 344 U. S. 183, 189.
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the requirements of the oath. Thus, in a brief per curiam decision
without a discussion of any of the other basic issues involved, the Court
pointed out a fundamental requirement for any valid loyalty oath-
scienter.8 s
The Garner case questioned the constitutionality of a City of Los
Angeles ordinance of 1948 requiring an oath that the employee had not
advocated or belonged to an organization advocating the overthrow of
the government by force or violence during the five preceding years.
8 9
The Court assumed that scienter was implicit in each clause of the
oath and that there was no denial of due process.40
The oath was attacked as a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto
law in that it denied government employment to persons because of an
affiliation that might have been terminated at the time the oath was
enacted into law. The majority of the Court held that it was not ex
post facto since it did not punish past lawful conduct 41 and that in the
absence of punishment, neither was it a bill of attainder. 42 The Court
cited U. S. v. Lovett4 3 for a definition of a bill of attainder 44 and ap-
parently limited its holding in that case by its decision in the Garner case.
In Adler v. Board of Education, the issue was the constitutionality
" Note, The Scienter Requirement and Retrospective Clauses in Loyalty Oaths,
3 D. B. J. 93 (1953).
"' The ordinance was passed pursuant to a 1941 Amendment to the City of Los
Angeles Charter which provided that no person should hold public office who had
within 5 years of the adoption of the amendment advocated, or belonged to a
organization which advocated the overthrow of the United States Government
or the Government of the State of California by force or violence. The amend-
ment gave the city council authority to pass an ordinance effecting it.
40 The Court stated, "We have no reason to suppose that the oath is or will be
construed by the City of Los Angeles or the California Courts as affecting ad-
versely those persons who during their affiliation with a proscribed organization
were innocent of its purpose, or those who severed their relations with any organi-
zation when its character became apparent.. ." 341 U. S. 716, 723.
"' The 1941 Amendment had been in force for the 5 years preceding the enact-
ment of the oath. For that reason, the conduct involved was not lawful at the time
it was engaged in and the subsequent act did not punish prior lawful conduct.
Therefore, it was not ex post facto. See notes 29 and 30 supra. The dissenting
judges would hold it to be a bill of attainder and hold Cummings v. Missouri, note
29 supra, and Ex Parte Garland, note 30 supra, to be applicable.
"2 The Court pointed out that punishment is a prerequisite to a bill of attainder
and stated, "We are unable to conclude that punishment is imposed by a general
regulation which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for
employment." 341 U. S. 716, 722.
" 328 U. S. 303 (1946). Congress had provided in the Urgent Deficiency Ap-
propriation Act of 1943, § 304 that the appropriation for the Interior Department
would lapse if it was used to pay the salaries of certain named employees. The
Court stated, "this permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the
government is punishment and of a most severe type. . . . Section 304, thus,
clearly accomplishes the punishment of named individuals without a judicial trial."
Id. at 316.
" "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named indi-
viduals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by
the constitution." 328 U. S. 303, 315.
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of the New York Feinberg Law45 which barred from employment in
the public schools persons who advocate or belong to organizations
which advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence.
Membership in certain listed organizations was made prima facie evi-
dence of the person's ineligibility to teach. This act was upheld on
the basis of a New York decision which had interpreted the law to re-
quire knowledge of the purpose of such organizations before the law
was applicable.46 The Court reiterated its past approach to the ques-
tion of right to government employment, stating, "it is equally clear that
they have no right to work for the state in the school system on their
own terms. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947).
They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid
down by the proper authorities of New York. 47 In the past, gov-
ernment employment had been treated as a privilege rather than a con-
stitutional right.4
8
However, in the last case of the series, the Wienian case,40 the Court
with reference to the above quotation from the Alder case stated "that
to draw from this language the facile generalization that there is no
constitutionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the
issue."50  But the Court further stated, "We need not pause to con-
sider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is
sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or
discriminatory."51
The Wieman case questioned the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
statute52 requiring public employees to take an oath similar to those in
Gerende and Garner. However, in Wieman, there was no requirement of
scienter in the language of the statute itself nor was there a state court
decision that made "knowledge" of the purpose of the organization a part
of the oath.53 The statute was attacked on the usual grounds that the
"IN. Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3021-22.
"' Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. 2d 806 (1950).
,7 342 U. S. 485, 492.
"'Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (D. C. Cir. 1950); aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 314 U. S. 918 (1951).
"'For discussions of this case, see: Note, Constitutional Law: Oklahoma
Loyalty Oath Unconstitutional as a Denial of Due Process, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 188
(1953) ; Note, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendnent-Validity of Statutes
Requiring Loyalty Oaths, 22 U. CGN. L. REv. 243 (1953); Note, Oklahoma
Loyalty Oath Void, 25 RocrY Mr. L. REv. 395 (1953); Note, Constitutional Law
-Due Process-Validity of State Statutes Requiring Public Employees to Take
Loyalty Oath-, 51 Micir. L. REv. 1076 (Mar.-Ju.-1953).0o 344 U. S. 183, 191.
3' Id. at 192.
1151 OK1.A. STAT. §§ 37.1-37.8 (1951).
"' The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had limited the organizations forbidden
by the statute to those listed as subversive by the attorney general prior to the
effective date of the statute and had upheld the constitutionality of the oath.
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oath is denial of due process, an ex post facto law, and a bill of at-
tainder.54  The Court distinguished the Wieman case from Gerende,
Garner, and Adler with the following statement, "Yet under the Okla-
homa Act the fact of association alone determines disloyalty and dis-
qualification, it matters not whether association existed innocently or
knowingly.... Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing
activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends
due process."55  In each of these cases, it had been emphasized that
the state must conform to the requirement of due process. 50
The Court does not go so far as to hold that one has a constitutional
right to public employment, but it makes it clear that one will be pro-
tected from exclusion by a statute which operates in a patently arbi-
trary or discriminatory manner 57 and that any such oath, to be consti-
tutional, must require scienter.58
Although the decision in the principal case will probably be of little
practical value to Professor Slochower in his attempt to retain his
tenure rights and job, the more liberal interpretation of the due process
clause, as contrasted to that advocated by the dissent,59 was desirable.
The Court in considering the question of a person's right to gov-
ernment employment in the Slochower case points out that "To state
that a person does not have a constitutional right to government em-
ployment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful,
and non-discriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities."60
It appears from these decisions that the Court does not consider gov-
ernment employment to be a constitutional right but it will give consti-
tutional protection to those already employed. It will not permit the
summary dismissal of an employee by operation of statute without op-
portunity for a hearing. The extent of the protection in the future may
be broadened but at the present time the statute providing for dismissal
must require evidence of the employee's unfitness. In the case of loyalty
Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131 (1951). The Okla-
homa Court refused to permit the teachers to take the oath as thus construed and it
denied petition for rehearing which was partly based on the ground that this
refusal was a denial of due process. The United States Supreme Court felt that
this refusal meant that the Oklahoma statute did not require scienter and was
faced with the question of whether innocent membership was sufficient basis for
removal from public employment.
"See notes 31, 32, and 33 supra.
rII 344 U. S. 185, 191. 350 U. S. 551, 556.
57 344 U. S. 185, 192. 8 See note 38 mstpra.
"' "For this Court to hold that state action in the field of its unchallenged powers
violates the Due Process . . . demands that this Court say ... that the action of
the Board . . . was inconsistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. A denial
of due process is 'a practice repugnant to the conscience to mankind.' Surely no
such restriction exists here." 350 U. S. 551, 562-3.
60 350 U. S. 551, 555.
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oaths, that evidence must show scienter on the part of the employee and
in the case of dismissal for use of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in a federal investigation or proceeding, a proper inquiry that
would show the employee's retention to be inconsistent with the best
interest of the state. This is a minimum of protection for the employee
but it is a recognition that some constitutional protection is necessary
and shows some tendency on the part of the Court to liberalize its
past interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment in the area of loyalty
oaths and statutes such as the one in the Slochower case.
CHARLES J. NooE
Criminal Law-Burglary in North Carolina
At common law, burglary was a felony punishable by death ;1 it was
regarded as an infamous offense against the habitation and not against
the property,2 or, as expressed at an early date, ". . . man's house is his
castle, and its security must not be lightly invaded." 3 To preserve this
security the law created safeguards imposing severe penalties on their
infringement. From the common law concept of burglary, however,
a number of statutory crimes associated with burglary have evolved,
each one extending the original scope further into the area of property
protection. Illustrative of this expansion is a recent amendment 4 to
G. S. § 14-54,5 which states where non-burglarious breaking or enter-
ing ". . . shall be wrongfully done without intent to commit a felony or
other infamous crine," (Emphasis added) a misdemeanor has been
committed. This amendment virtually completes the statutory modifica-
tion of crimes associated with the elements of common law burglary.
A brief examination of the development of these related crimes within
the framework of the North Carolina statutes and decisions is the
purpose of this note.
Burglary was defined originally as the breaking and entering, in
the night time, of a dwelling house of another," with intent to commit
a felony therein. 7 Since 1889, the offense has been divided into two
degrees. The gravamen of first degree burglary is that the crime is
14 BLACxSTONE, COMMENTARIES *228.
212 C. J. S., Burglary § lb (1944).
39 AM. JUR., Burglary, 240 (1937) ; State v. Williams, 90 N. C. 728 (1884).
See also State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 52 S. E. 2d 880 (1949).
IN. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1015; see also 33 N. C. L. REV. 538 (1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1955).
6 Under common law, it was immaterial that the occupant of the dwelling house
was not present. State v. Foster, 129 N. C. 704, 40 S. E. 209 (1901) ; 4 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARES *225.
1 State v. Langford, 12 N. C. 253 (1827). Under common law, it was imma-
terial that the felony intended was not committed, State v. Morris, 215 N. C.
552, 2 S. E. 2d 554 (1939) ; State v. Allen, 186 N. C. 302, 119 S. E. 504 (1923).
[Vol. 35
